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Abstract 
The Idaho National Laboratory, in collaboration with Idaho State University’s Idaho Accelerator Center and the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, continues to develop the Pulsed Photonuclear Assessment (PPA) technique for shielded nuclear material detection in large 
volume configurations, such as cargo containers.  In recent years, the Department of Homeland Security has supported the development of 
a prototype PPA cargo inspection system.  This PPA system integrates novel neutron and gamma-ray detectors for nuclear material
detection along with a complementary and unique gray-scale, density mapping component for significant shield material detection.  This 
paper will present the developmental status of the prototype system, its detection performance using several INL Calibration Pallets, and 
planned enhancements to further increase its nuclear material detection capability. 
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1. Introduction 
For over a decade Idaho National Laboratory (INL), in 
conjunction with Idaho State University’s Idaho 
Accelerator Center (IAC) and Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LANL), has been developing active 
interrogation systems based on photonuclear techniques for 
a variety of inspection applications.1-3 Through the 
sponsorship of the Department of Energy’s Office of 
Nonproliferation and National Security (NA22), the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and most 
recently DHS’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 
(DNDO), the photon-based interrogation methodology has 
been developed into a prototype, field-deployable system 
that can identify shielded nuclear material in an array of 
different cargo containers.  The prototype Pulsed 
Photonuclear Assessment (PPA) inspection technology 
uses pulsed, accelerator-generated, energetic photons to 
induce photofissions (and neutron-induced fissions) in 
shielded nuclear materials.  Customized neutron and 
gamma-ray detectors monitor the induced radiation for 
specific time- and energy-dependent signatures indicating 
the presence of nuclear material.  Additionally, the system 
utilizes a Grayscale Density Mapping (GSDM) system 
which can detect high-density (or significant quantities of  
low-density) shielding materials in cargo loadings. The 
PPA system has successfully demonstrated the ability to 
identify nuclear material within high- and low-Z (atomic 
number) shielding configurations. Functional tests have 
been conducted using a series of customized INL 
Calibration Pallets. Constructed from materials spanning a 
range of atomic numbers and physical densities, the pallets 
were designed and manufactured as representative 
configurations for testing the PPA and other active 
interrogation system against shielded nuclear materials.  
Tests using the INL Calibration Pallets have illustrated the 
viability of using a photonuclear-based system to rapidly 
scan and identify the presence of nuclear material in a 
variety of cargo loading configurations. Planned 
enhancements to the PPA system will further increase the 
nuclear material detection sensitivity and will address 
radiation safety concerns related to field-deployment 
applications.  These enhancements will likely include the 
following: (1) utilization of prompt (<1?s after the flash) 
radiation emissions; (2) next-generation source/accelerator 
design to minimize the unwanted low-energy photon dose, 
and (3) interrogation with higher energy (>10 MeV) 
photons using appropriate electron-to-photon converter 
dimensions. 
22.  Current PPA Inspection Technology 
2.1. System Configuration 
The current PPA inspection configuration, shown in 
Figures 1 and 2, was selected to facilitate the inspection of 
12.2-m cargo containers while keeping the axis, defined by 
the detector assemblies, perpendicular to the long axis of 
the cargo container and offsetting the accelerator beam 
axis.  For inspection evaluation tests, an offset angle of 42o
was selected with a 250-cm standoff distance from the 
photon source.  This configuration corresponds to the 
maximum possible distance from the detectors to the center 
of the cargo container.   
Figure 1.  Plan view of  PPA system configuration. 
Figure 2.  End view of PPA system configuration. 
2.2. Theory of Operation 
The PPA inspection system consists of a selectable-
energy (2-12 MeV) electron accelerator - the Varitron1,
which produces 3-?s bursts of high-energy bremsstrahlung 
radiation.  Photons having energies greater than about 6 
MeV will initiate (?,n) and (?,f) reactions that release 
energetic neutrons promptly (<10-12 s).  If nuclear material 
is present, emitted neutrons will thermalize and further 
generate fission events.  Additionally, delayed neutrons 
will be emitted from unstable neutron-rich fission products 
(delayed neutron precursors).  If no nuclear material is 
present, the delayed region (> 2 ms after the photon flash) 
will be virtually free of energetic neutrons.  Likewise, 
prompt and delayed gammas are also emitted during these 
processes and can also be exploited to indicate nuclear 
material.   
2.3. PPA System Components 
The integrated detection system acquires neutron 
information using an array of 18 Photonuclear Neutron 
Detectors (PNDs) monitoring the neutron emissions from 
an interrogated cargo loading.   The PND is a 16-kg, 117-
cm long, 10.16-cm diameter neutron detector containing an 
internal high voltage power supply, an INL-built 
preamplifier, and a 10-atm., 2.54-cm diameter, 3He tube 
surrounded by concentric rings of polyethylene moderator, 
cadmium metal, and high-content, boron-loaded shielding. 
The combination of shielding materials with specific 
dimensions makes the detector sensitive to neutrons with 
0.1-keV to 1.0-MeV energies and insensitive to both the 
ubiquitous thermal neutrons and any fast neutrons greater 
than ~2 MeV present after each accelerator pulse.  The 
PND signals are compared in real-time to the actively 
induced, neutron background signal to determine if nuclear 
material is present. This neutron background is monitored 
with four PNDs located near the primary PND arrays, but 
unlike the primary array, these PNDs have their 
polyethylene shroud openings turned away from the cargo 
under interrogation.  The final neutron signal monitored is 
the thermal neutron environment, which is measured with 
an unshielded, conventional 3He tube of identical 
dimensions to those used in the PNDs. Photon radiation is 
monitored using unshielded, LND (Model 719) Geiger-
Müller (GM) gamma-ray detectors co-located with each 
PND.  These detectors have been selected due to their 
operational simplicity and their inherent interaction and 
recovery processes which are necessary for successful 
operation in a pulsed photon environment.  Finally, there 
are 9 GM detectors (also LND 719’s) operated in a 
proportional mode for a GSDM which gives information 
corresponding to the nature of the shielding located 
between the interrogating photon source and the 
transmission mapping detector array. These transmission 
mapping detectors are used to detect high-density (or a 
significant amount of low-density) shielding. 
3. Detection Performance with INL Calibration Pallets 
3.1. INL Calibration Pallets 
Extensive testing to detect nuclear material in simulated 
cargo container loadings has been conducted with a set of 
specifically designed and constructed pallets.4 This 
3representative set of cargo loadings is referred to as the INL 
Calibration Pallets.  Table 1 summarizes some key 
characteristics of these Calibration Pallet designs.  
Table 1. Calibration Pallet Designs5
Pallets Mass (kg) Primary 
Material 
Material 
Density 
(g/cc) 
Empty 46 Aluminium 2.70 
CelotexTM 90 CelotexTM 0.05 
Borated 
Polyethylene 
1012 5%-Borated 
polyethylene 
1.05 
Polyethylene 923 Polyethylene 0.95 
Wood 482 Plywood 0.48 
Lead 254 Lead 10.80 
Iron 890 Iron 7.80 
Calibration Pallet designs provide complete, 
4??shielding of a central void in which is placed nuclear 
material. The CelotexTM, Borated Polyethylene, 
Polyethylene and Wood Pallets are rectangular in shape 
each measuring 1.07-m in depth, 0.86-m in width, and 
1.02-m in height.  The Lead and Iron Pallets are cylindrical 
with a radial thickness of 5.08 and 16.51 centimeters, 
respectively.  These pallet dimensions allow them to be 
loaded into conventional cargo container and allow 
flexible, but identical, testing configurations for any 
interrogation technique. 
3.2. Testing with the Calibration Pallets 
Experimental verification of the detection capability of 
the PPA system has been performed using surrogate 
nuclear material (depleted uranium (DU)) positioned within 
the center of Calibration Pallets in various cargo container 
inspection configurations.  Within the integrated 
acquisition system, an alarm can be generated based on 
either the neutron response from the PND or the photon 
response with the GM detectors.   An alarm is triggered by 
the PNDs when the measured signal, from either a single 
detector or a grouping of three adjacent detectors, is larger 
than the average background neutron signal and a preset, 
user-specified multiple of the standard deviation of the 
background signal.  In order to utilize photon signatures in 
the interrogation environment, both the gamma-ray and 
thermal neutron signals must be monitored.  The time-
dependent thermal neutron response (nth) is measured and 
compared to the GM detector response (?) in order to 
develop a time (t)-dependent Figure-of-Merit (FOM) that is 
mathematically evaluated after each accelerator pulse 
according to Equation 1. 
Equation 1.  Figure of  Merit calculation for GM detection algorithm. 
The bulk of the gamma-ray detection is due to (n,?)
capture reactions.  Accordingly, the ratio of the photon-to-
thermal neutron signal is relatively insensitive to changing 
cargo loadings. Any additional delayed gamma-ray 
contribution from nuclear material, such as prompt gammas 
from thermal neutron fissions, or gamma-rays from the 
decay of delayed neutron precursors, will increase the time-
dependent FOM value above a nominal FOM curve.  
By utilizing these two algorithms, the nuclear material 
detection capability has correctly detected nuclear material 
in all pallet scenarios. In most pallet configurations, the 
detection occurs in substantially less than the typical 120-
second interrogation times.   Furthermore, PND and GM 
detector normalization techniques have eliminated false 
positives that had been sporadically seen in the Borated 
Polyethylene and Polyethylene Calibration Pallets.  Early 
tests utilized a delayed region counting window of 1.92-
7.68 ms after each accelerator pulse.  Optimization of this 
window (currently 4-7.68 ms) has increased the signal-to-
noise by approximately 10 percent.  In addition, an off-axis 
sensitivity study illustrated that nuclear material could be 
detected (in selected cargo loadings) even when located up 
to 38 cm from the accelerator beam centerline. 
4. Enhancements to Increase Fissile Material Sensitivity 
4.1. Utilization of Prompt Radiation 
Most active interrogation techniques including the 
current PPA system, have utilized the delayed neutron and 
gamma-ray response while largely ignoring the prompt 
emissions. While delayed emissions are generated on 
timescales of milliseconds to several seconds making them 
easier to distinguish from the interrogating flash, they are 
much less abundant than the prompt emissions.  On 
average, only 0.0158 delayed neutrons are emitted from a 
thermal 235U fission compared to 2.5 prompt neutrons.  
Exploitation of prompt radiation (defined as during an 
accelerator pulse/(photo)fission event and/or immediately 
after (< 1 μs)) has the potential to dramatically reduce 
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4interrogation times.  Recent preliminary experiments (using 
fast plastic scintillators) conducted at the IAC suggest that 
it is indeed possible to extract prompt neutron emissions 
within a pulsed environment.   
4.2. Next Generation Source/Accelerator Design 
Typical Linacs produce bremsstrahlung radiation having 
a broadband photon energy spectrum.  As the electron 
energy is increased, the photon flux and its corresponding 
forward collimation increase.  Unfortunately, this comes at 
a price of a larger unwanted, lower energy photon 
component.  It is interesting to note, however, that the 
inherent forward-collimation (with electron beam energy) 
only results in about a factor of two increase in the 90-
degree dose at these energies.  For field- deployable 
applications such as the PPA system, it is highly desirable 
to be able to produce only the usable energies within this 
broad spectrum while minimizing the production of 
undesirable, low-energy x-rays.  While typical approaches 
focus on accelerator shielding to achieve the desired dose 
levels, this approach is not feasible with 
transportable/mobile applications.  Tailoring of the photon 
spectrum will likely be achieved through a combination of 
customizing the electron source, converter target design 
and shielding configurations.  A successfully designed, 
next generation accelerator would nominally be compact 
(~1m; <500kg), would have a converter/collimator 
assembly producing a narrow band of photon energies with 
pulses as short as one nanosecond, and would use a 
relatively “thin” converter thickness (with appropriate 
transmission electron rejection technique).  Electron 
energies should be selectable up to 20 MeV with a high 
repeatability and good energy resolution.  
4.3. Interrogation with Higher Energy Photons (>10 MeV) 
Because of current food irradiation/inspection limitations, most 
active-interrogation studies with the PPA system have been 
performed with electron beam energies at or below 10 
MeV.  This is despite the fact that clinical applications 
using photon energies in excess of 10 MeV are already well 
established, with some oncology applications reaching as 
high as 50 MeV. While this 10-MeV energy limit currently 
applies to cargo inspections, the World Health Organization 
has indicated that higher energy electron beam operations 
could be considered for future operations.   
Notwithstanding the current 10-MeV electron beam 
energy limitation, there are definite advantages to be 
realized with using higher photon energies for inspections. 
At higher photon energies, several phenomena contribute to 
increased shielded nuclear material detection sensitivity. 
Two of the most important are:  (1) increased ability for 
source photons to penetrate shielding, and (2) enhanced 
(?,n) and (?,f) cross sections in materials, such as 235U and 
239Pu. Numerical and experimental assessments have been 
conducted for various electron beam energies from 8 to 30 
MeV.  Increases of up to three orders of magnitude in 
delayed signatures have been measured over these energy 
ranges.  Prompt emission detection would further extend 
detection sensitivities with potentially lower delivered 
cargo doses and increased throughputs. 
5. Summary 
The prototype PPA system is operational at INL and has 
demonstrated its capability to detect shielded nuclear 
material in representative cargo container inspection 
configurations.  Utilizing neutron and gamma-ray 
detection, nuclear material has been detected in a variety of 
specially designed Calibration Pallets.  Investigation into 
the exploitation of prompt fission signatures promises to 
unlock a prolific source of information that is currently 
underutilized. Highly tunable accelerators capable of 
producing specific energies required for photonuclear 
interrogation would minimize unwanted cargo and operator 
doses.  Interrogations with energies higher than 10 MeV 
have the advantage of increasing the delayed neutron 
signal-to-noise by at least an order of magnitude.  
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